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## NIETZSCHE AND THE METHODOLOGICAL FICTIONS: FROM LOGICAL UNITY TO METHODOLOGICAL PLURALISM

Nietzsche was a thinker whose work was characterized from the outset by a preoccupation with the temporal aspects and the historical sense from which no philosophizing can escape. In his thought, important historical disciplines like historiography and philology converge to engender what he called “genealogy”: an interpretive procedure that seeks not only to unmask the provenance of our values, but also to point toward future events. This is the point of view of a philosopher who reflected extensively on historicity and historical sense, and therefore asserts that his work, even without readers in his own time, would become known. This is because the issues he engaged with would be unavoidable for future philosophers, such as the advent of nihilism.

It is possible that Nietzsche was right about the “destiny” of his work. However, Richard Schacht argues that Nietzsche research must always be attentive to the interpretations made of the philosopher.<sup>1</sup> According to Schacht, every fifteen or twenty years, it becomes necessary to rescue Nietzsche from assimilations to different modes of thought. While he is economical in listing these specific appropriations, Schacht touches upon a point that is not only important but also central to the challenges of Nietzsche research: the intense and multifaceted critical reception of a thinker from whose work we are separated by little more than 100 years. We can highlight at least two reasons why Nietzsche’s work has generated so many different readings and appropriations: the plurality of themes he addresses and the diverse strategies he employs in his language. Regarding the first point, we can mention art in general, music, tragedy, history, language, science, metaphysics, culture, rationality, knowledge, education, and so forth. Regarding the second point, this profusion of themes finds its expression in a variety of forms: letters, aphorisms, treatises, dissertations, poems, and even musical compositions.

While these questions have already been extensively addressed in the *Nietzsche-Forschung*,<sup>2</sup> perhaps understanding Nietzsche’s philosophical project as an attempt to

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<sup>1</sup> Schacht undertakes a critical reassessment of naturalist interpretations, of which he is himself a proponent. He recalls the considerable interpretive work that was required for Nietzsche’s philosophy to be taken seriously within analytic philosophical circles. At the same time, however, he nuances Nietzsche’s own relation to naturalism, noting that his position ranges from a critique of mechanistic strands of naturalism to an endorsement of the possibility of naturalizing the human being. In this respect, Schacht rejects a reductionist and scientific reading of Nietzsche’s naturalism [Schacht 2011: 41].

<sup>2</sup> For example: [Nehamas 1985; Wotling 2001; Derrida 2001].

think together his different philosophical approaches and the styles in which they are articulated remains a task yet to be undertaken. For among the strategies that run through this plurality of themes is the construction of a philosophy that does not reject contradiction and paradox as modes of expression. Thus, his work has been appropriated by antagonistic political schools, such as anarchists, National Socialists, the political right, and the French left, as well as attracting the attention of French postmodern thinkers and philosophers within the analytic tradition – two philosophical traditions that differ considerably from one another. Our objective in this text is to outline a general conception of language in Nietzsche, following the development of his philosophy from *The Birth of Tragedy* onwards. We aim to demonstrate why his considerations on language culminate in the defense of a plurality of styles, which serve as expressions of the plural dynamic of our physio-psychology (*Physio-Psychologie*).

This text, therefore, does not aim merely to examine Nietzsche's explicit remarks on language. Rather, it seeks to explore how his reflections on the subject, particularly his identification of language's inherent limits, come to shape the very fabric of his philosophical work as it struggles with these constraints. Present from his earliest writings onward, Nietzsche's analyses of language exhibit a remarkable theoretical coherence through their critique of dogmatism, metaphysics, and truth. While *The Birth of Tragedy* still defends certain metaphysical principles, it also contains a denunciation of Socratic philosophy – specifically, its rationalism and dialectic, which Nietzsche sees as establishing a dogmatism founded on belief in truth. In later unpublished writings, such as the *Course on Rhetoric* and *On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense*, this anti-dogmatic stance and critique of truth are expanded through a view of language that posits rhetoric as a fundamental key to understanding cognitive processes. However, even though these two writings broaden Nietzsche's anti-dogmatic perspective, they are still under the sphere of influence of Kant and Schopenhauer. Therefore, beginning with *Human, All Too Human*, the critique of language intensifies, becoming a central path for unmasking dogmatic and metaphysical philosophy. At this stage, Kant and Schopenhauer themselves become two primary targets of this critique.<sup>3</sup>

Nietzsche's positions in his first works reveal that language is structured in rhetorical terms,<sup>4</sup> and even the principles of logic do not escape this condition. In the *Course on Rhetoric*, as well as in *On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense*, Nietzsche argues that language contains no adequate expression (*adäquaten Ausdruck*) in relation to things, and further, that the principles of logic operate as metaphors, metonymies, and synecdoches [Nietzsche 1989: 21-25]. Still deeply influenced by the Kantian transcendental legacy, the young Nietzsche adopts the distinction between the thing-in-itself and phenomenon, putting it to aesthetic use, as seen in *The Birth of Tragedy*. In this work, he opposes art to the

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<sup>3</sup> As Marina Silenzi observes, the commentators who have devoted the most sustained attention to Nietzsche's reflections on language have tended to focus on his early writings, particularly those from the period between 1869 and 1873 [Silenzi 2023: 100]. Seeking to broaden the scope of Nietzsche's reflections, Silenzi demonstrates a series of continuities between 1872–1873 and 1878–1888. Although her primary focus lies elsewhere – namely, in showing the importance of language for unconscious bodily processes – her analysis corroborates our thesis that reflections on language permeate Nietzsche's entire work and reveal a continuum. This development unfolds much like a musical composition, in which themes emerge and transform, yet maintain a harmonic unity.

<sup>4</sup> We are considering the philosophical perspective from which Nietzsche understands rhetoric. A crucial figure for Nietzsche's formulation of rhetoric and its figures is Gustav Gerber [Meijers 1988].

dogmatism of science, a dogmatism he believes was inaugurated by Socrates and has since exercised a harmful dominion over the West. Still following the Kantian tradition – often through the lens of Schopenhauer’s influence –, Nietzsche conceives a rehabilitation of rhetoric grounded in a theory of knowledge.<sup>5</sup> This means that if language structures itself essentially in terms of rhetorical figures, it is the very own physiological conditions that make clear why the language only expresses itself rhetorically.<sup>6</sup> This thesis is encapsulated in the famous passage according to which truth is a mobile army of metaphors, given that words are transpositions that occur physiologically: a nerve stimulus first transferred into an image! The image in turn reshaped into a sound! [Nietzsche 1988a: 875].

A consequence of these presuppositions is the critique of a metaphysical ontology that postulates the existence of things in themselves. However, we also find, in unpublished fragments from the early 1870s, many texts in which Nietzsche analyzes why synthetic *a priori* judgments are also examples of the rhetorical nature of language [Nietzsche 1988c: 495].<sup>7</sup> Analogous to Kant’s procedure, which begins from the logical judgments to deduce the categories, Nietzsche starts from the analysis of the linguistic relations to justify that rhetoric is founded in our cognitive capacities. However, despite this complex relationship of proximity and distance to transcendental idealism, there is a crucial point that escapes the young Nietzsche’s attention, but that will become central in his works from the second period onward: the problem of the unity of consciousness.

The young Nietzsche had already recognized that one of the decisive steps underpinning the philosophical method, one that defines every thinker, is the proposition that “everything is one” (*der Satz “Alles ist Eins”*) [Nietzsche 1988a: 813]. However, siding with Heraclitus and his philosophy of opposites and affirmation of becoming, Nietzsche already harbored suspicions toward any essentialist ontology. For this reason, his rhetorical conception of language combats what he will later call, in works such as *Human, All Too Human* and *Beyond Good and Evil*, the atomism of language [Nietzsche 1966: 24].

However, as we have seen, his early works fail to provide an adequate response, because they are still linked to the assumptions of Schopenhauer and Kant. The theses on the

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<sup>5</sup> According to Allan D. Schrift, Nietzsche’s movement toward the representational model of language and rhetoric has a double consequence: to limit the authority of epistemology while at the same time extending the scope of rhetorical research [Schrift 1990: 130].

<sup>6</sup> In this regard, Sarah Scheibenberger notes that the genesis of language is explained by a physical-causal schema, which conceives universal concepts as the logical result of individual bodily impressions. This process is understood as a transference from one sphere to another, and therefore its basis is metaphorical and rhetorical, for it establishes an analogy between rhetorical tropes and the fundamental operations of the origin of language. This explains why it cannot be an adequate expression and why the correspondence theory itself is a fiction of language, in the same way that truth and lies are [Scheibenberger 2016: 15-16].

<sup>7</sup> Most and Fries argue that Nietzsche’s principle that language is rhetorical represents a radical reformulation of Gerber’s theses, who still maintained a separation between the domains of language as art and its other aspects (grammar, semantics, phonetics, etc.). This Nietzschean view loses itself in its own implications: the conception of language as tropes and figures renders scientific-philological activity impossible, which supposedly led the philosopher to abandon it in his later works [Most, Fries 2014: 26]. In our view, they are correct in this reading. *On Truth and Lie* becomes entangled in aporias; indeed, after considering that the nature of language is rhetorical, Nietzsche must agree with Kant that concepts such as time, space, and number ensure a certain ideality, making certain phenomena of nature predictable and universal [Nietzsche 1988a: 885]. The corpus of texts from 1871–1873, on the one hand, radicalizes the conception of language by sustaining the rhetorical aspects of Kant’s transcendental logic, and on the other hand, agrees with the ideality of certain concepts.

rhetorical origin of language in *On Truth and Lie* find their limit in the tacit acceptance of the Kantian principle of the transcendental unity of apperception – the unity through which the manifold given in intuition is unified in a concept of the object [Kant 1998: 250]. By conceiving that time, space, and number ensure the conditions of regularity in natural phenomena, Nietzsche preserves an instance of language that is not rhetorical.<sup>8</sup>

Therefore, the rupture effected by the later works also involves a critique of the subject and consciousness as instances responsible for the production of unities – whether subjective, linguistic, or logical. With the analysis of the notion of subject and of consciousness, Nietzsche broadens his critique of language. Now, his reflections on logic no longer encounter merely a rhetorical counterpoint; rather, the range of expressive means expands toward a plurality of perspectives. Thus, Nietzsche’s consideration of logic associates it with the unity of consciousness and of the subject, while the multiplicity of expressions of language appears as the consequence of the dynamic plurality of bodily processes.

Nietzsche argues that two classical principles of logic – the principle of non-contradiction and the principle of identity – can be explained in terms of the development of the human organism. Consequently, our cognitive structure is the result of atavistic mechanisms inherited from lower organisms. From these organisms, the human intellect retains the mark of a mode of evaluation that appropriates the surrounding world through the criteria of pleasure and pain. The notion of identity has been inscribed in human beings since the early stages of development, insofar as diversity was reduced to a form of identity. As a result, individual experiences are suppressed, leaving only a basic relational structure in which one avoids pain and seeks pleasure.

As stated in aphorism 18 of *Human, All Too Human*: “It is from the period of the lower organisms that man has inherited the belief that there are *identical things* [...] The original belief of everything organic was from the very beginning that all the rest of the world is one and unmoving” [Nietzsche 1996: 21]. As a necessary resource for survival, this reduction of multiplicity to unity results from what Nietzsche later calls the basic will of the spirit (*Grundwillen des Geistes*), a force that seeks to appropriate what is foreign through the assimilation of the new to the old, the simplification of the complex, and the rejection of what is entirely contradictory. Therefore, each fragment of the “external world” (*Aussenwelt*) must be marked and distinguished, because in the struggle for survival, the ability to simplify the diverse swiftly can be decisive for organisms that need to live, grow, and multiply, as paragraph 230 of *Beyond Good and Evil* clarifies [Nietzsche 1966:159].

Paragraphs 18 of *Human, All Too Human* and 230 of *Beyond Good and Evil* illustrate a recurring procedure in Nietzsche’s work: the investigation of the history of the genesis of thought (*Entstehungsgeschichte des Denkens*). This approach is part of his broader critique of philosophy, which he accuses of regarding logic as the superior form of understanding human nature, while failing to recognize that it is merely one legitimate form among others with which philosophical work should occupy itself. What matters first for Nietzsche is to show that logic is part of a varied system through which man interprets the

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<sup>8</sup> I developed this discussion further in the book *As Artes de Proteu* [*The Arts of Proteus*; Lima 2018: 45-78]. In this work, I argue that the influence of Schopenhauer and Kant on Nietzsche’s early writings offered him solutions to the aporias to which his arguments led. This is the case with the rhetorical affirmation of language, which finds in Kantian transcendental logic the unifying principle of the concepts that make common understanding possible. This prevents each human subjectivity, in the process of metaphorical transposition, from violating the infallibility of the laws of nature (*Unfehlbarkeit der Naturgesetze*) [Nietzsche 1988a: 885].

world for the purposes of appropriation and the increase of power. This tendency toward domination that logic exerts, always by means of an apology of knowledge, stems from the ambiguous role that philosophy itself plays in relation to science. On the one hand, it can be considered the apex of the pyramid of knowledge; on the other hand, its utility is questioned when compared to the sciences. Resembling art, which seeks to confer depth and meaning upon life, philosophy, however, seeks in the apology of knowledge to compete with the sciences.

There has hitherto been no philosopher in whose hands philosophy has not become an apologia for knowledge; on this point at least each of them is an optimist, inasmuch as he believes that knowledge must be in the highest degree useful. They are all tyrannized over by logic, and logic is by its nature optimism [ibid.: 15].

It is important to point out that Nietzsche's characterization of logic does not amount to a critique of rationality and a defense of irrationalism. On the contrary, he is convinced that the history of the genesis of thought, which will ultimately reveal how much we stand to lose under the tyranny of logic, cannot be written without the support of the patient and rigorous work of science [Nietzsche 1996: 23]. For Nietzsche, the task is to retranslate man back into nature. This implies freeing oneself from the superficial interpretations imposed upon the eternal text of *homo natura* [ibid.: 161], such as the belief in a distinct origin for the human being, which would explain, among other things, the attempt to reduce human nature to a merely logical one [ibid.: 28].

The distinction between the thing-in-itself and phenomena, established by a rigorous logic, opens the path, according to Nietzsche, to make metaphysics something worthy of Homeric laughter. Once liberated from its metaphysical counterpart – the so-called unconditioned world –, the world of phenomena may be evaluated as a “outcome of a host of errors and fantasies which have gradually arisen and grown entwined with one another in the course of the overall evolution of the organic being” [ibid.: 20]. The illogical (*Unlogische*) belongs to this world of errors and fantasies; it is embedded in art, religion, and language. Thus, if the goal of considering human nature only in terms of what is logical within it were to be achieved, an entire series of phenomena would be lost in the process. It is this critique of logic's tyranny over philosophy that leads Nietzsche to adopt a broad conception of language, one in which no form of expression should be disregarded. To that end, the philosopher puts into practice his own exhortation: that of retranslating man back into nature.

By means of that history of genesis of thought, this retranslation aims to analyze the psychic “experiences” (*psychischen “Erfahrung”*) from the perspective of an authentic psychophysiology (*eigentliche Physio-Psychologie*), showing why these experiences reveal the development of the processes inherited from primitive organisms. Just as happens in the organism's relation to the “external world”, where it simplifies the other beings around it, thereby dominating them more easily, the physiological processes of the organism itself are reduced from multiplicity to simplicity.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> Günter Abel argues that the will to accumulate force is characteristic of all living things, leading to a joint and reciprocal action of forces. This action characterizes each center of force, that is, each center of will to power, from conscious thought, through the organic realm, and even into the inorganic. Within these formations, which appear externally as units of relative duration and stability, there is continuous and multifaceted activity. Therefore, in each center of force of the will to power, there is plural activity. He concludes that, for Nietzsche, that belief, which takes the soul as something

That commanding something which the people call “the spirit” wants to be master in and around its own house and wants to feel that it is master; it has the will from multiplicity to simplicity, a will that ties up, tames, and is domineering and truly masterful [Nietzsche 1966: 159].

The simplification process that produces concepts results in a language of signs (*Zeichensprache*) derived from our logical-psychic world (*logisch-psychischen Welt*). This language of signs that translates our psychic processes is not something we can rid ourselves of. Nietzsche, however, does not consider that psychic experiences permit a merely logical deduction of human nature. First, he argues that logical forms and the knowledge expressed by them are a reflex of our world of sensations – what the philosopher calls “prejudices of the senses” (*Sinnen-Vorurteil*) and “psychological prejudices” (*Sinnen-Vorurteil / psychologisches Vorurteil*) [Nietzsche 1988e: 259]. To interpret this language of signs that translates the prejudices of our sensations constitutes, for Nietzsche, semiotics (*Semiotik*). In this sense, semiotics is characterized as a symptomatology (*Symptomatologie*), an art of interpreting signs as physiological symptoms. However, Nietzsche himself, as we shall see, will make a much more extensive use of the notion of semiotics.

Nietzsche analyzes the mechanistic conception of the world and argues that it operates with fictions – specifically two: the concepts of movement and of the atom. The first is taken from the language of our senses; the second is derived from our psychic experience. To be able to count, we need the concept of unity, which is derived from our internal experience. It is through this experience that we arrive at the notion of the “self”. However, states Nietzsche, the concepts of thing and of unity that derive from the notion of the self do not ensure that real unities exist. The unity from which the concept of self is formed, as well as the notion of things and unities in the external world, comes from that reduction from multiplicity to unity. Beyond this psychological prejudice, there is also that of the senses, which explains the concept of movement. This is because the way the sense of touch and the eye represent the world creates the notion of a world in motion.

Only by means of fictions – such as that of unities – can the world with which mechanism operates be calculated. Science “invents” causal units: atoms, for example, whose effects are constantly changing. There is a subjective process of creation of a self, by means of which one arrives at the concept of subject, thing, unit, number. Therefore, from the concept of subject, we create the concept of the atom. In relation to the notion of activity, which separates cause from effect, we find the presupposition of a subject that produces an action. This, in turn, formulates a conception of movement derived from the sensations produced by the eye and the sense of touch. In a fragment from the spring of 1888, Nietzsche writes:

Phenomenal is therefore: is the interference of the concept of number, the concept of subject, the concept of movement – we still have our eye, our psychology within it. If we eliminate these ingredients, then no things remain, but dynamic quanta, in a relation of tension with all other dynamic quanta: whose essence consists in their relation to all other quanta, in their “effecting” upon them. [Nietzsche 1988e: 259]

If the first conception of semiotics that Nietzsche adopts refers to a symptomatology, it does not represent its full dimension. Indeed, it is not just a matter of understanding the

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indestructible, eternal, indivisible, like a monad, like an atom, must be eliminated from science! [Abel 1984: 82-85].

psychophysiological process of concept formation and its importance for logic, but also of inquiring into the meaning of the concepts themselves. In this sense, Nietzsche also refers to a semiotics when he seeks the meaning of language and its reference to things. Serving as a support for science, language has allowed man to establish one world (that of language) alongside another (that of phenomena), and thereby to dominate and appropriate the latter. However, states Nietzsche, this world constructed in language, in many respects, has no relation to things, as is the case with logic and mathematics, although the development of both can be understood as an evolution from semantics to syntax.<sup>10</sup>

This is because, in the beginning, the process of naming entailed a belief in the existence of concepts. In the beginning, logic assumed the existence of substances and identical things, and mathematics assumed the existence of points, straight lines, and magnitudes. It is only belatedly that it is noticed that these concepts do not correspond to anything in reality [Nietzsche 1996: 16]. Moreover, beyond logic and mathematics, mechanism – which interprets the world by means of concepts derived from our psychic experience – is subjected to a series of notions such as those of subject, object, atom, and movement. These, in Nietzsche’s words, “designate a mere semiotics and do not designate anything real [*Reale*]” [Nietzsche 1988e: 257].

When Nietzsche’s focus shifts from the merely syntactic character of language – seeking, instead, to find the meaning it can convey – he begins to analyze it according to other conceptions. Consider, for example, the 13th paragraph of the second dissertation of *On the Genealogy of Morality*, which contains the statement that only that which has no history can be defined. What is subject to historicity is immersed in the fluidity of its development in such a way that the multiplicity of meanings cannot be reduced to a unity. This unity can only be achieved through the concealment of the fluidity and variety of meanings, in a condensation of many concepts that are grouped together semiotically (*semiotisch*). Here, too, the semiotic perspective refers to the erasure of the history of language’s development and the process of concept formation, as concepts detach themselves from the primitive intentions from which they were originally created.

Nietzsche focuses on the concept of punishment, analyzing practices that, when viewed from a later perspective, might be considered penalties, but whose original meaning was quite different. Among many examples, he mentions punishment as a celebration, “in the form of violating and mocking an enemy, once he is finally conquered” [Nietzsche 2007: 54]. Thus, while the concept of punishment, from a later perspective, may “signify” only penalty, it actually conceals an entire process of different meanings throughout history – such as that of festivities.<sup>11</sup>

In this way, Nietzsche subsumes the problem of the history of the genesis of thought and the development of language and concepts under the question of semiotics. It falls to the art of interpretation to comprehend (*verstehn*) the meaning of what resides in the semiotic process. In the case of moral concepts, Nietzsche’s analysis in relation to language gains in scope and depth. If one of his best-known passages on interpretation is the one in which he states, against positivism, that there are no facts, only interpretations [Nietzsche 1988d: 315], it is certain that the most extensive exploration of this thesis appears in *On*

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<sup>10</sup> For a characterization of the semantic and syntactic in Nietzsche, see: [Hales 1996: 819-835].

<sup>11</sup> As Andreas Urs Sommer claims, the supposedly most essential purpose of punishment, namely, to awaken a sense of guilt, is precisely what the usually expected punishment does not achieve [Sommer 2019: 27].

*the Genealogy of Morality*. There, he develops a variation of it, affirming that there are no moral phenomena, only moral interpretations of phenomena.

In the case of punishment, which Nietzsche considers indispensable for the history of morality, since it was the seed from which the most important branches of morality sprang, it is necessary to seek the multiple meanings that lie behind the semiotic unity under which it belatedly appears. For this reason, its definition is not possible, since defining consists in disregarding the fluidity of meanings that the concept of punishment carries with it throughout its history. We move beyond, therefore, the problem of language's lack of meaning and its lack of reference to things, toward a consideration of interpretation and the emergence of concepts. If semiotics begins with the formulation of the problem of language in terms of symptomatology, the search for meaning and reference consists in comprehending that very meaning. To comprehend is to interpret.

[...] *that there are no moral facts at all*. Moral judgement has this in common with religious judgement, that it believes in realities which do not exist. Morality is merely an interpretation of certain phenomena, more precisely a misinterpretation. [...] In this respect moral judgement should never be taken literally: as such it is only ever an absurdity. But as a semiotics it remains inestimable: it reveals, at least to anyone who knows, the most valuable realities of cultures and interiorities which did not know enough to "understand" themselves. Morality is merely sign language, merely symptomatology: you must already know what is going on in order to profit by it. [Nietzsche 1998: 33]

This passage condenses many themes tied to the problem of language that we have examined here. From the perspective of semiotics, morality proves to be merely a language of signs that interprets poorly understood phenomena and, in this interpretation, postulates entities that have no reality. In the end, what moral language reveals is not an accurate interpretation of the phenomena to which it tries to refer, but only psychophysiological symptoms. A good interpretation is one that seeks to understand these symptoms well. We are, therefore, faced with a language of signs that, from the perspective of semiotics, reveals a lack of reference to the phenomena it intends to signify. Yet, seen through the perspective of symptomatology, it allows one to auscultate that which is behind the signs. This auscultation, in turn, must be done with the tools of good interpretation.

Putting this art of interpretation into practice in *The Anti-Christ*, Nietzsche considers the metaphorical character of the language used by Jesus. The initial language used by primitive Christianity was borrowed from a Semitic language. Appropriating its concepts, Jesus gives them a new interpretation. They cease to refer to the old meanings; they no longer refer to reality. An antirealist par excellence, Jesus turns the language he appropriates into an occasion for metaphors (*Gleichnisse*) [Nietzsche 1988b: 203].

We see, therefore, that Nietzsche's tendency to consider the rhetorical and poetic aspects of language was not relegated to his initial writings. Importantly, within this same framework of the problem of language as semiotics and symptomatology, he also analyzes the music of Wagner. In the seventh paragraph of *The Case of Wagner*, just after defining decadence as the disaggregation of the whole – in which parts gain independence – Nietzsche states that the German composer searches for a semiotics of sounds (*Ton-Semiotik*) for gestures.

Nietzsche interprets the music of Wagner through the psychology of the composer. In other words, that disaggregation and lack of organicity that characterize the German Wagnerian musical dramas would be the expression of the artist's own nature. Identifying

decadence with Wagner's style, since in him the part separates from the whole and exerts a tyranny over the organic totality, Nietzsche offers us further elements to understand his critique of the attempt to reduce philosophy to logic or to the theory of knowledge, in its quest to compete with science. Since language is the expression of bodily processes, it will be all the richer the more it translates the multiplicity with which the affects arrange themselves in the body. It is thus that Nietzsche interprets his own style when he analyzes *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* in *Ecce Homo*. And the philosopher, who attributes a lack of reference to reality in languages such as that of mechanism, metaphysics, the Christian religion, and the music of Wagner, affirms about language: "as if the things themselves approached and offered themselves as metaphors [*Gleichnisse*]" [Nietzsche 1988b: 339].

Thus, in our understanding, in Nietzschean language, things seem to offer themselves as metaphors because it knew how to express the multiplicity of styles and forms with which the bodily process effects itself, being the language of signs one of these forms. By exposing his own philosophy from this profusion of styles, Nietzsche bequeathed us a work that can be compared, to remember a myth he enjoyed, to the figure of Proteus, that changes shape as soon as he is to be captured.

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**Márcio José Silveira Lima**

**Nietzsche and the Methodological Fictions: from Logical Unity to Methodological Pluralism**

The paper offers a systematic interpretation of Friedrich Nietzsche's reflections on language and logic by arguing that they function as methodological fictions grounded in a psychophysiological account of cognition. It first shows that Nietzsche's early claim that language is fundamentally rhetorical, while still shaped by Kantian assumptions, generates a tension between the metaphorical character of concepts and the logical requirement of unity. The paper then argues that Nietzsche resolves this tension by rejecting the unity of consciousness and reconceiving the human being as a multiplicity of drives. From this shift, it follows that logical principles such as identity and non-contradiction are not conditions of truth, but simplifying functions rooted in the organism's need to stabilize experience. On this basis, language is reinterpreted as a semiotic and symptomatic process rather than a representational system. The paper concludes that Nietzsche's later philosophy adopts a pluralist methodology: insofar as cognition expresses a plurality of drives, the philosopher's own writing manifests itself in multiple forms and styles.

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**Марсіо Жозе Сілвейра Ліма**

**Ніцше і методологічні фікції: від логічної єдності до методологічного плюралізму**

У статті запропоновано систематичну інтерпретацію міркувань Фридриха Ніцше про мову й логіку. Стверджується, що останні функціонують як методологічні фікції, ґрунтовані на психофізіологічному поясненні пізнання. Спочатку показано, що раннє твердження Ніцше про мову як фундаментально риторичну, хоч і сформовану кантівськими засновками, породжує напругу між метафоричним характером понять і логічною вимогою єдності. Далі стверджується, що Ніцше усуває цю напругу, відкидаючи єдність

свідомості та переосмислюючи людську істоту як множину потягів. З цього зсуву випливає, що логічні принципи, такі як тотожність і несуперечність, є не умовами істини, а спрощувальними функціями, закоріненими в потребі організму стабілізувати досвід. На цій основі мова переосмислюється як семіотичний і симптоматичний процес, а не як репрезентативна система. У статті висновується, що пізня філософія Ніцше приймає плюралістичну методологію. Позаяк пізнання виражає множинність потягів, власне письмо філософа виявляється в численних формах і стилях.

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