Зарождение дискуссии об авторской интенции в американской критике и философии

Abstract

The article deals with the origin and formation of debating positions in American criticism and philosophy. It analyzes “Intentional Fallacy” by W. Wimsatt and M. Beardsley. as well as E.D. Hirsch’s texts concerning the idea of objective interpretation which initiated this discussion.

In fact, both positions are limited because of their normative and ahistorical character. Both sides try to regulate interpretation. Wimsatt and Beardsley lose the historical place of a text, whereas Hirsch reduces the historical place of an interpreter.

Anti-intentionalism of Wimsatt and Beardsley relies on interpretative practice of American New Criticism with its principle of work’s autonomy. Despite the article’s empirical character, its important outcome is negation of subjectivity of meaning, and formulation of premises of its intersubjective understanding.

Hirsch affirms the invariability of work’s meaning and with this purpose (1) identifies it with the author’s intention binding it with the notion of intentionality and author’s horizon-context (based on Husserl and Dilthey), (2) introduces the distinction between meaning and significance (based on Frege and Saussure). Despite the contradictions of Hirsch’s positions both in understanding these ideas and in his own conclusions, his merit is the statement of the problem of meaning in general and extending the discussion into the territory of hermeneutics and philosophy of literature.