Застосування теорії ігор для оптимізації вартості споживаної електроенергії для потужних споживачів в умовах ринку
Вантажиться...
Файли
Дата
Автори
Назва журналу
Номер ISSN
Назва тому
DOI
Анотація
With the development of renewable energy sources (RES) and the adoption of a number of strategic documents
aimed at accelerating the transition to sustainable energy in Ukraine and in Europe, the consumption of electricity from
renewable sources has become an important factor in ensuring the efficiency of industrial production and the positive
image of companies. However, given the risks associated with the instability of RES electricity production, as well as
variable consumption and, as a consequence, changing prices on the electricity market, ensuring minimum costs of
electricity supply to industrial consumers is a challenging task of forward planning and operational management. In the
paper, a non-cooperative game model between different types of electricity suppliers at the upper level with
optimization of the cost of electricity purchase by large consumers at the lower level is used to solve this problem.
Based on the concept of cost with risk, an algorithm for direct purchase of electricity by large consumers is proposed,
taking into account the uncertainty of spot market prices. The results show that large consumers can reduce their power
purchase costs by combining power purchase operations in the long-term, medium-term and spot power markets. Risk
reduction in renewable energy purchases for large consumers is associated with shifting from the spot market to the
medium-term, long-term market or the electricity options market.
Опис
Ключові слова
УДК
Тип документа
Мова
ISSN
Бібліографічний опис
Стружко І., Кулик В. Застосування теорії ігор для оптимізації вартості споживаної електроенергії для потужних споживачів в умовах ринку // Матеріали LIV Всеукраїнської науково-технічної конференції підрозділів ВНТУ, Вінниця, 24-27 березня 2025 р. Електрон. текст. дані. 2025. URI: https://conferences.vntu.edu.ua/index.php/all-feeem/all-feeem-2025/paper/view/23503.
Схвалення
Рецензія
Доповнено
Цитується в
Список використаної літератури (6)
- Yang Jiajia, Zhao Junhua, Luo Fengji, Wen Fushuan, Dong Zhao Yang. Decision-Making for Electricity Retailers: A Brief Survey[J]. IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, 2018, 9(5).
- Wu C, Zhao Q, Xi M. A retailer-supplier supply chain model with trade credit default risk in a supplier-Stackelberg game[J]. Computers & Industrial Engineering, 2017,112.
- Yin Linfei, Li Shengyuan, Gao Fang. Equilibrium Stability of Asymmetric Evolutionary Games of Multi-Agent Systems With Multiple Groups in Open Electricity Market[J]. IEEE Access, 2020,8.
- LI Fei, LI Xianshan, LU Mingfang, ZHANG Lei. Optimization model of direct power purchase game between power producers and large users taking into account the quota assessment constraint[J]. High Voltage Technology, 2023, 49(01):128-137.
- Qing L, Yufeng Z. A multi-objective optimization model considering users' satisfaction and multi-type demand response in dynamic electricity price[J]. Energy, 2022, 240.
- Bo S, Mingzhe L, Fan W, et al. An incentive mechanism to promote residential renewable energy consumption in China's electricity retail market: A two-level Stackelberg game approach[J]. Energy, 2023, 269.