Спроба подолання суб'єкт-об'єктного підходу в філософії та естетиці Михайла Бахтіна

Abstract

The article proposes the analysis of Mikhail Bakhtin’s philosophy of act as the surmounting of the subject-object approach specific for the transcendental tradition of philosophy. The notion of act is analyzed as the way out of the frame of the opposition of consciousness and being in transcendental philosophy up to Husserl. The parallel with the Heidegger’s philosophy is indicated. Nevertheless Bakhtin retains dependence from transcendental philosophy. His notion of act has some common features with Descartes’ cogito. The residing dependence from transcendental approach is determined by the uncritical reliance on phenomenological method. This results in Bakhtin’s philosophy and aesthetics partial contradiction to its own claims on its pretheoretical character since the main provisions of the philosophy of act are already loaded with historical cultural predispositions. At the same time it is possible to speak of the transitional character of Bakhtin’s early philosophy and aesthetics.