Концептуальні умови («)Монадології(»)

Abstract

The article is an attempt to juxtapose the conceptual bases of work “Monadology” with monadology as one of the basic conceptions of Leibniz’s philosophy in general. “Monadology” begins with the definition of monad as a simple substance. But is this definition the beginning of monadology as a theory? In § 53 of “Monadology” Leibniz pointed out that in the ideas of God there is an infinite number of possible universes, and only one of them can be actual. So, the choice of the world and the ideas of possible universes both conceptually precede monade as a simple substance. The article analyses these preconditions via Leibniz’s concepts of “palace of fates” (palais de destinées) and “confusion”. The consideration of these concepts is realized in comparison with some scientific theories, including Dean Kenyon’s theory of biochemical predestination and Michael Behe’s theory of irreducible complexity.