Кантове «Я мислю» та Фіхтеве «Я є»

Abstract

One of the central problems in philosophy after Kant is the meaning and systematic func-tion of self-consciousness. This essay explores the question of how Kant’s concept of self-consciousness and the thinking subject relates to Fichte’s “I”, and what the relevant grounds are possible for Fichte’s view that in his doctrine of “I think” Kant had already “pointed” at the highest principle of the Wissenschaftslehre “I am”. A comparison of Kant’s “I think” with the line of argument of § 1 of Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre shows that Fichte follows Kant in the theoretical grounding of self-consciousness in judgmental functions, and in this way Fichte shared a position already presented by Kant that the concept of self-consciousness contains the thought of a groundless subject, spontaneously generating knowledge of its own existence.