dc.contributor.author | Plínio Junqueira Smith | en |
dc.contributor.author | Плініо Жункейра Сміт | uk |
dc.date.accessioned | 2024-06-11T07:10:41Z | |
dc.date.available | 2024-06-11T07:10:41Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2023 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Plínio Junqueira Smith Neo-Pyrrhonism: a contemporary version of skepticism [Текст] / Plínio Junqueira Smith // Sententiae. – 2023. – № 3. – С. 47-66. | en |
dc.identifier.issn | 2075-6461 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 2308-8915 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://ir.lib.vntu.edu.ua//handle/123456789/42694 | |
dc.description.abstract | This paper presents and argues for a contemporary version of skepticism: neo-Pyrrhonism. Interest in the history of skepticism engendered a new, more complex and attractive conception of skepticism. Accordingly, many philosophers now claim they are skeptics. In line with what they say, I develop neo-Pyrrhonism as I see it. It has a negative part, in which dogmas are criticized, and a positive one: first, the neo-Pyrrhonist lives his life according to his skeptical principles and following everyday life, and, second, he is able to describe philosophically his skeptical view of the world, thereby offering possible solutions to philosophical problems empirically conceived. | en |
dc.description.abstract | У цій статті представлено й обґрунтовано сучасну версію скептицизму: неопірронізм. Інтерес до історії скептицизму породив нову, складнішу і привабливішу концепцію скептицизму. Тож багато філософів зараз стверджують, що вони скептики. Відповідно до того, що вони кажуть, я теж розвиваю неопірронізм, як його бачу. Він містить негативну частину, в якій критикуються догми, і позитивну: по-перше, неопірроніст у своєму житті йде за своїми скептичними принципами і повсякденністю; по-друге, він здатен філософськи описати свій скептичний погляд на світ, пропонуючи тим самим можливі розв’язки емпірично осягнутих філософських проблем. | uk |
dc.language.iso | en | en |
dc.publisher | ВНТУ | uk |
dc.relation.ispartof | Sententiae. № 3 : 47-66. | en |
dc.relation.uri | https://sententiae.vntu.edu.ua/index.php/sententiae/article/view/966 | |
dc.subject | dogmatism | en |
dc.subject | suspension of judgment | en |
dc.subject | everyday life | en |
dc.subject | skeptical view of the world | en |
dc.subject | догматизм | uk |
dc.subject | утримання від судження | uk |
dc.subject | повсякденне життя | uk |
dc.subject | скептичне бачення світу | uk |
dc.title | Neo-Pyrrhonism: a contemporary version of skepticism | en |
dc.title.alternative | Неопірронізм: сучасна версія скептицизму | uk |
dc.type | Article | |
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dc.identifier.doi | https://doi.org/10.31649/sent42.03.047 | |
dc.identifier.orcid | https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5239-3190 | |