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dc.contributor.authorPlínio Junqueira Smithen
dc.contributor.authorПлініо Жункейра Смітuk
dc.date.accessioned2024-06-11T07:10:41Z
dc.date.available2024-06-11T07:10:41Z
dc.date.issued2023
dc.identifier.citationPlínio Junqueira Smith Neo-Pyrrhonism: a contemporary version of skepticism [Текст] / Plínio Junqueira Smith // Sententiae. – 2023. – № 3. – С. 47-66.en
dc.identifier.issn2075-6461
dc.identifier.issn2308-8915
dc.identifier.urihttps://ir.lib.vntu.edu.ua//handle/123456789/42694
dc.description.abstractThis paper presents and argues for a contemporary version of skepticism: neo-Pyrrhonism. Interest in the history of skepticism engendered a new, more complex and attractive conception of skepticism. Accordingly, many philosophers now claim they are skeptics. In line with what they say, I develop neo-Pyrrhonism as I see it. It has a negative part, in which dogmas are criticized, and a positive one: first, the neo-Pyrrhonist lives his life according to his skeptical principles and following everyday life, and, second, he is able to describe philosophically his skeptical view of the world, thereby offering possible solutions to philosophical problems empirically conceived.en
dc.description.abstractУ цій статті представлено й обґрунтовано сучасну версію скептицизму: неопірронізм. Інтерес до історії скептицизму породив нову, складнішу і привабливішу концепцію скептицизму. Тож багато філософів зараз стверджують, що вони скептики. Відповідно до того, що вони кажуть, я теж розвиваю неопірронізм, як його бачу. Він містить негативну частину, в якій критикуються догми, і позитивну: по-перше, неопірроніст у своєму житті йде за своїми скептичними принципами і повсякденністю; по-друге, він здатен філософськи описати свій скептичний погляд на світ, пропонуючи тим самим можливі розв’язки емпірично осягнутих філософських проблем.uk
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherВНТУuk
dc.relation.ispartofSententiae. № 3 : 47-66.en
dc.relation.urihttps://sententiae.vntu.edu.ua/index.php/sententiae/article/view/966
dc.subjectdogmatismen
dc.subjectsuspension of judgmenten
dc.subjecteveryday lifeen
dc.subjectskeptical view of the worlden
dc.subjectдогматизмuk
dc.subjectутримання від судженняuk
dc.subjectповсякденне життяuk
dc.subjectскептичне бачення світуuk
dc.titleNeo-Pyrrhonism: a contemporary version of skepticismen
dc.title.alternativeНеопірронізм: сучасна версія скептицизмуuk
dc.typeArticle
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dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.31649/sent42.03.047
dc.identifier.orcidhttps://orcid.org/0000-0001-5239-3190


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