Франц Брентано как передтеча аналитической философии

Abstract

The paper considers F. Brentano’s judgement theory and its influence upon the development of analytical philosophy. It is asserted that this judgement theory in Brentano’s reistic ontology, using the notion of accidental extension, leads to the creation of the existence of things “by word”. Such an “art” becomes possible only when the “accidental extension” is treated as an aesthetic or ethic evaluation. Brentano owes the separation of a logical evaluation of “truth” to Descartes’ dualism. Judgement theory does not satisfy the criterion of intersubjectivity. Therefore Brentano as well as his admirers must read the judgements by description. It is stated that the description defence mechanism against the expression of the presented subject in language lies in the fact that it does not allow for the unique junction in the composition of the description of existence and essence (accidental extension), allowing to express the existence of only a part of the presented subject.